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Brucellosis: Who is at Risk?  
• Farmers 
• Shepherds, Goat 
Herders, Cattlemen  
• Veterinarians 
• Laboratory Workers 
• Abattoir Workers 
Occupational Risk Non-Occupational Risk 
• Travellers 
• Hunters 
• Consumers of 
unpasteurized dairy 
products 
Interesting Factoid:  Over the past ~60 years 
2% of all brucellosis cases have been 
laboratory acquired. 
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Routes of Exposure 
• Human infectious dose 
10-100 organisms by 
respiratory route 
 
• Mucous membrane, 
conjunctivae or non-intact 
skin contact with cultures 
or infected tissues  
 
• Ingestion (mouth 
pipetting) 
 
• Percutaneous 
– Including accidental 
inoculation with vaccine 
strains  
• B. abortus stain 19, RB51 
• B. militensis Rev-1 
• Person to person transmission 
rare 
• Brucella antigen 
hypersensitivity Rxn is rare 
hazard in lab staff and 
occasional hazard in animal 
care staff 
•First documented LAI  with Brucellosis (Brucella 
melitensis) occurred in 1897 via syringe 
•1930-1978, 426 LAIs, 5 Deaths (Pike 1978) 
•1941, Meyer and Eddie reported 76 Brucella LAIs 
beginning in 1897 and 74 lab infections in the United 
States between 1922-1939 
•1979 -2004, 143 LAIs, 4* Deaths (Beyers 2006) 
 
 
 
Brucellosis: Historical Recorded 
Laboratory – Associated Infections 
Biosafety Risk Assessment:  
Safety Risk Groups 
• Risk Group 1 
– No or low individual and community risk 
– Unlikely to cause human or animal disease 
• Risk Group 2 
– Moderate individual risk, low community risk 
– Can cause disease but unlikely to be a serious hazard. Lab 
exposures may cause serious infection, but effective treatment and 
preventative measures are available and risk of spread of infection 
is limited. 
• Risk Group 3 
– High individual risk, low community risk 
– Usually causes serious human or animal disease but does not 
ordinarily spread. Effective treatment and preventative 
measures are available. 
• Risk Group 4 
– High individual and community risk 
– Usually causes serious human or animal disease and can be 
readily transmitted. Effective treatment and preventative measures 
are not usually available. 
 
BSL for Diagnostic Work 
• BSL-2 practices, 
containment equipment 
and facilities. 
• Operations that 
generate aerosols or 
splashes should be 
conducted within a 
 Biological Safety 
Cabinet 
BSL-2 
BSL-3 for Culture  
and  
Animal Studies  
• Biosafety level 3 is 
appropriate for handling 
Brucella cultures or 
infected membranes, 
fetal tissues and fluids. 
• ABSL-3 practices, 
containment equipment 
and facilities are 
recommended for animal 
studies 
BSL-3 
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Lab Procedures That Emit Aerosols 
• Pipetting 
• Mixing 
• Shaking 
• Centrifugation 
• Grinding 
• Blending 
• Vortexing  
• Sonic Disruption 
• Opening Lypholized 
Cultures 
• Flaming bacteriologic loops 
• Entering or opening 
vessels to sample liquid 
under pressure 
Engineering Controls 
• Primary Barriers 
– Biological Safety 
Cabinets (BSC) 
– Enclosed Containers 
– Animal Isolators 
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Personal Protective Equipment 
• Gloves 
• Coats 
• Gowns 
• Shoe 
Covers 
• Boots 
• Respirators 
• Face Shields 
• Safety Glasses 
• Safety Goggles 
• Hearing Protection 
Occupational Health and  
Medical Surveillance 
• All persons working with virulent Brucellae should be 
kept under close clinical and serological surveillance 
• Educate staff on human symptoms and have policy in 
place for staff to report symptoms  
• Consider providing laboratory workers with medical 
cards which include, at a minimum, the following 
information:  
− Genus and species of organism which they work with 
− 24-hour contact numbers for principal investigator and 
institution’s occupational health care provider(s) 
 
Occupational Health and 
Medical Surveillance 
• Emergency Response or Treatment 
– Laboratory exposure 
– Accident or injury in the laboratory 
– Post-exposure samples (recommended sequential serologic 
testing at 0, 6, 12, 18, and 24 weeks post exposure) 
– Provide treatment (Doxycycline 100mg twice daily and 
rifampin 600mg once daily for 3 weeks) 
– Re-examination of the patient before allowing them to return 
to work after a laboratory exposure 
http://www.cdc.gov/brucellosis/laboratories/risk-level.html 
• Program to prevent loss, theft or misuse of 
microorganisms, biological materials, and research-
related information 
– Protect pathogens from dangerous people 
– Limit access to areas that contain certain biological 
agents or assets 
• Guidance documents 
– WHO Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance, 2006 
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_EPR_2006_6.pdf 
– U.S. BMBL Section VI—Principles of Laboratory Biosecurity 
http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/index.htm   
Defining Laboratory Biosecurity 
COMPONENTS OF 
LABORATORY BIOSECURITY 
Basic Truism About Security Systems  
A security system cannot protect every asset against every 
conceivable threat 
• Security resources are not infinite 
• Security systems should be based on the asset or material 
that requires protection 
• Security systems should be designed to address unique 
operations 
The Take Home Message 
• Comprehensive biosafety/biosecurity training 
and consistent procedures for all personnel 
working with Brucella species is needed 
• Brucellosis has been documented as one of the 
most frequently acquired laboratory infections.  
the importance of using appropriate biosafety 
practices and facilities cannot be over 
emphasized. 
• Laboratory security measures should be based 
on a sound risk assessment but should not 
negatively impact the research mission.  

